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Fourth Amendment Limitations on Eavesdropping
and Wire-Tapping
David H. Hines*
E AVESDROPPING HAS BEEN DEFINED as any form of "surreptitious fact
finding which may intrude upon individual privacy."'  Actually,
eavesdropping is a catch-all term that covers all sorts of surveillance,
from overhearing with the naked ear words spoken by another, to moni-
toring the conversations and movements of others by highly scientific and
sophisticated electronic devices.2 It includes listening to conversations
of others, wire-tapping, and "bugging." 3 The essence of eavesdropping
is that words spoken by one are overheard by another without the
knowledge and authorization of the speaker. The Supreme Court of
the United States has distinguished eavesdropping from electronic re-
production of conversations where the recording person is one of the
parties to the conversation and is either a government agent4 or an
informer.5 The rationale is that the agent or informer is merely making
a mechanical reproduction of a conversation to which he was a part in
order to prove his own credibility.0 The subject of eavesdropping, wire-
tapping, and electronic surveillance has induced many legal writers to
comment on the law and urge legislative changes.7 This paper will
* B.S., Northwestern Univ.; President, The Hines Flask Co., Cleveland, Ohio;
Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
I Note, Electronic Surveillance and the Right of Privacy, 27 Mont. L. Rev. 173 (1966).
2 For a complete presentation of the various types of electronic eavesdropping and
the uses to which they are put see Dash, Knowlton, and Schwartz, The Eavesdrop-
pers (1959); also see Breton, The Privacy Invaders (164). A machine is presently
being developed that will relay information concerning the location, communica-
tions, activities, and physical condition of the person under surveillance, Note, An-
thropotelemetry, Dr. Schwitzgebel's Machine, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 403 (1966).
3 Swire, Eavesdropping and Electronic Surveillance: An Approach for a State
Legislature, 4 Harv. J. on Leg. 23 (1966); Dash, Knowlton, and Schwartz, op. cit.
supra, n. 2.
4 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323
(1966).
5 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966).
6 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd 341 U.S. 494 (1950).
7 In the last two years legal writers have been prolific on the subject of wire-tapping
and eavesdropping. A non-exhaustive list is: Schwartz, The Wire-tapping Problem
Today, 2 Crim. L. Bull. 3 (Dec. 1966), 3 Crim. L. Bull. 3 (J.-F. 1967); Electronic Sur-
veillance and the Right of Privacy, supra n. 1; Sullivan, Wire-tapping and Eaves-
dropping: A Review of the Current Law, 18 Hast. L. J. 59 (1966); Westin, Science,
Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1960's, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1003
(1966); Templar, Admissibility of Evidence Secured by Eavesdropping Device, 5
Washburn L. J. 174 (1966); Note, Eavesdropping Orders and the Fourth Amendment,
66 Colum. L. Rev. 355 (1966); Note, Electronic Surveillance and the Right of Privacy,
supra n. 1; Swire op. cit. supra n. 3; Barton, Law-Enforcement Wire-tap Policy in
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analyze the constitutional aspects of eavesdropping as well as the com-
mon law concerning eavesdropping as it exists today.
Eavesdropping and the Constitution
Eavesdropping at one time was a common law crime.8 No such
clear common law crime exists in the United States today, but because
of the widespread use of electronic surveillance by law enforcement of-
ficers9 and the recent demands for individual constitutional rights,'0
grave constitutional issues have arisen. The Self-Incrimination Clause
of the Fifth Amendment" is, perhaps, one area of the Constitution that
may apply to eavesdropping, 12 because the accused is making incrimi-
nating statements without having been provided with adequate safe-
guards to protect his Fifth Amendment rights. 13 Another area of the
Constitution that may apply is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 14 where evidence obtained in an unlawful and outrageous
manner cannot be used.15 The Supreme Court, however, traditionally
has handled the issue under the search and seizure provisions of the
Fourth Amendment, 1 which seems to be the proper area of the Consti-
tution,17 since eavesdropping usually is a search for evidence.
Although the Fourth Amendment does not expressly create a right
of privacy, it was decided early that the search and seizure provisions
(Continued from preceding page)
the United States, 2 Crim. L. Bull. 15 (J.-F. 1966); Reubhausen & Brim, Privacy and
Behavioral Research, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1184 (1965); Kent, Wiretapping: Morality
and Legality, 2 Hous. L. Rev. 3 (1965); Note, Eavesdropping and the Constitution:
A Reappraisal of the Fourth Amendment Framework, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 378 (1965);
Comment, Do We Have to Live With Eavesdropping?: A Legislative Proposal, 38 So.
Cal. L. Rev. 622 (1965); Aspen, Court-Ordered Wiretapping: An Experiment in
Illinois, 15 De Paul L. Rev. 15 (1965); Electronic Eavesdropping-The Inadequate
Protection of Private Communication, 40 St. John's L. Rev. 59 (1965); Semerjian,
Proposals on Wiretapping in Light of Recent Senate Hearings, 45 B. U. L. Rev. 216
(1965); The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem, A Symposium, 44 Minn. L. Rev.
813 (1960).
8 IV Blackstone, Commentaries § 168.
9 Dash, Knowlton, and Schwartz, op. cit. supra, n. 2.
10 American Civil Liberties Union, The Wiretapping Problem Today (1965 rev. ed.).
11 ". . . nor shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. .. ."
12 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
13 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
14 ".. . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .. "
15 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); see dissenting opinion in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128
(1954).
16 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized."
17 Eavesdropping and the Constitution: A Reappraisal of the Fourth Amendment
Framework, supra n. 7.
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impliedly create such a right.' s To safeguard this right of privacy19 the
Fourth Amendment is to be liberally construed.20 To fit the eaves-
dropping problem into the Fourth Amendment, it was necessary for the
Court to construe the search and seizure provisions so that not only the
expressed items of persons, houses, papers, and effects were protected,
but also unexpressed items such as spoken words. In Wong Sun v.
United States,21 the court clearly stated that verbal statements are
protected by the Fourth Amendment.
The principal factor that has determined constitutionality of the
wire-tapping and eavesdropping cases has been trespass into a constitu-
tionally protected area.2 2 The first case to be decided was Olmstead v.
United States23 where federal prohibition agents tapped the telephone
wires of several suspects. The taps were installed on telephone wires
outside the homes of the suspects, and the Court held that since there
was no physical invasion of the premises, there was no violation of the
search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment. The majority
stated that wire-tapping, absent a trespass, was not protected by the
Fourth Amendment, because one who uses wires that go all over the
world logically must expect that his message may not be private.
Justices Brandeis and Holmes, each of whom wrote a separate dissent,
felt that the case was clearly within the protection of the Fourth
Amendment and that evidence so obtained should be disallowed. De-
spite the Holmes-Brandeis dissents and many others since,24 Olmstead
is still the law today.
Perhaps the most blatant trespass occurred in Irvine v. California25
when police obtained access to the defendant's home without his knowl-
edge, and installed a microphone. Not being able to hear clearly, they
re-entered the home twice, once to change the microphone to the bed-
room and again to change it to the closet. These actions clearly were a
violation of the Fourth Amendment because the requisite trespass was
present, although the Court was not ready to apply the protective pro-
visions of the Fourth Amendment to the states.
18 Boyd v. United States, supra n. 12.
19 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
20 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28
(1927); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Grau v. United
States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932).
21 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
22 Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 1283 (1964).
23 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
24 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199
(1952); On Lee v. United States, supra n. 5; Irvine v. California, supra n. 15; Lopez v.
United States, supra n. 4; Osborn v. United States, supra n. 4; see concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Douglas in Berger v. New York, 387 U.S. ____ (1967).
25 Irvine v. California, supra n. 15.
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In the case of On Lee v. United States, 20 no trespass was found
when an informer entered the defendant's laundry with a hidden radio
transmitter and a federal agent outside listened to the conversation.
The informer hadn't trespassed because he had the implied consent of
the defendant. The federal agent hadn't trespassed since his listening
post was outside the building.
Physical penetration was the test in Silverman v. United States.
27
Police inserted a microphone ("spike-mike") through a common wall
until it made contact with the heating ducts, thus establishing effective
eavesdropping in the house next door. Because the physical penetra-
tion constituted a trespass, the evidence was not admissible. The Court
also said that trespass is not to be determined by local law, but by the
actual intrusion into a Constitutionally protected area. In other cases
the lowering of a microphone into a ventilator 2s and the penetration of
a thumb tack 29 have been held to be trespasses under the authority of
Silverman.
The difference between trespass and legal eavesdropping is clearly
illustrated in the case of Goldman v. United States.30 Federal agents ob-
tained access to the defendant's office and installed a listening device.
When the listening device failed to work the agents used a detectaphone
which when pressed against a wall could pick up sounds from the room
on the other side of the wall. The Court held that the evidence was
admissible because there was no trespass as to the detectaphone. The
Court said that if the first device had worked, there would have been a
trespass as to evidence obtained by it, and the evidence so obtained
would have been inadmissible.
Thus, the constitutional interpretation is that evidence obtained
from wire-tapping or eavesdropping is admissible unless there is an un-
authorized trespass, or physical invasion into a constitutionally protected
area.31 What then is a constitutionally protected area? A business office,
a store, a hotel room, an occupied taxicab, a home, all have been held to
be constitutionally protected areas,3 2 while such places as public lava-
tories33 and barns3 4 are not within the protection. Electronic surveil-
26 Supra n. 5.
27 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
28 Cullins v. Wainwright, 328 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1964); cert. denied 379 U.S. 845
(1964).
29 Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964), affirming per curiam 204 Va. 275, 130
S.E.2d 437 (1963).
30 Goldman v. United States, supra n. 24.
31 Annot., supra n. 22.
32 Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
33 Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965); cert. denied 382 U.S. 981
(1966).
34 Eversole v. State, 106 Tex.Crim.App. 567, 294 S.W. 210 (1927).
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lance of prisoners in confinement is beyond the protection,'3 but it has
not yet been decided whether the privileged communications between
a lawyer and his client are protected even though they are overheard
in a place that is normally not within the protection. The Supreme
Court recently remanded one case" and refused certiorari on another,'"
so that the lower courts could give a full determination to this problem.
Another court refused to compel the lawyer to testify to the authentic-
ity of the conversation in a collateral proceeding.38
Evidence obtained from an unreasonable search and seizure cannot
be used in federal courts.3 9 As to state courts, the Supreme Court ex-
pounded what it thought to be the final rule in Wolf v. Colorado4°
when it refused to apply the Fourth Amendment to the states. Later
decisions41 upheld the Wolf decision until 1961, when the course was
changed abruptly by Mapp v. Ohio,42 which held that evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment was inadmissible not only in
federal courts, but also in state courts. Subsequent decisions have made
it clear that the Fourth Amendment now applies to the states by reason
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 3
Wire-Tapping and the Communications Act of 1934
Shortly after the decision in Olmstead v. United States,44 Congress
passed Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934. 4 5 Although
Section 605 was passed only a few years after Olmstead, it seems clear
that the primary intent of Congress was not to ban wire-tap evidence in
criminal cases, but merely to prohibit wire-tapping in general.46 The
applicable part of Section 605 is as follows:
. . . no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, sub-
stance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communica-
tion to any person. .... 47
35 Lanza v. New York, supra n. 33; annot., supra n. 23.
36 Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966).
37 Davis v. United States, 384 U.S. 953 (1966).
38 In re Lanza, 4 App. Div.2d 252, 164 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1957).
39 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
40 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
41 Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951); Irvine v. California, supra n. 15.
42 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
43 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
44 Supra n. 23.
45 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 605.
46 Sullivan, op. cit. supra n. 7.
47 47 U.S.C.A. § 605, Communications Act of 1934 also provides in part: "... no
person having received such intercepted communication or having become ac-
quainted with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or
any part thereof, knowing that such information was so obtained, shall divulge or
(Continued on next page)
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The term "intercept" means to take or seize the message before it
reaches its destination.48 Parties to a telephone communication alter-
nately are senders and receivers.49 This would indicate that to have
consent to intercept a telephone call, one would need the authorization
of both parties.
There is no violation of Section 605 when one overhears words
spoken into a telephone and does not hear the other half of the con-
versation.50 The Supreme Court in the case of Rathbun v. United
States 1 held that when one of the parties to a telephone conversation
authorizes another to listen to the conversation by means of an exten-
sion telephone, there is no violation of Section 605 so long as the exten-
sion is not specifically installed for the purpose of eavesdropping. The
Court said that a telephone communication itself is not privileged, and
one party cannot force the other to communicate in secrecy merely by
using the telephone. Every person who is a party to a telephone con-
versation assumes the risk that the other party may have an extension
phone and may allow another to overhear the conversation.
One authority claims that Section 605 prohibits all wire-tapping,5 2
but the Attorney General of the United States has taken the position
that Section 605 prohibits wire-tapping only when it is accompanied by
divulgence of the contents of the communication. 53 He has contended
that disclosure within the Department of Justice is not divulgence of
the contents within the meaning of Section 605, 5 4 and it is on this
basis that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has conducted wire-taps
when expressly authorized by the Attorney General. 55
Section 605 is personal to the parties to the communication 5 and
when recordings of conversations of others were played back to witnesses
to persuade them to testify, testimony so procured was admissible. 7
Although the express sanctions of Section 605 are criminal, it has been
held that the Section also creates a civil right.58
(Continued from preceding page)
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same
or any part thereof, or use the same or any information therein contained for his
own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto .. "
48 United States v. Yee Ping Jong, 26 F.Supp. 69 (W.D. Penn. 1939).
49 United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1940).
50 Goldman v. United States, supra n. 24.
51 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
52 Swire, op. cit. supra n. 7.
53 Katzenbach, An Approach to the Problems of Wiretapping, 32 F.R.D. 107 (1963).
54 Ibid.
55 Sullivan, op. cit. supra n. 7.
56 Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
57 Ibid.
58 Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d. Cir. 1947).
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Most of the cases have been concerned with the applicability of
Section 605 to the states. Section 605 applies to intrastate commerce as
well as interstate commerce because it is necessary to control one to
control the other 59 and because intrastate messages are sent over inter-
state wires."° It is clear that evidence obtained in violation of Section
605 is inadmissible in federal courts"' when the violation is committed
by federal officers.6 2 It also is inadmissible in federal court when the
offense is committed by state officers acting pursuant to state law.-
Evidence discovered from information obtained from an unlawful wire-
tap likewise is inadmissible. 4
The courts consistently have refused to apply the federal rule of
inadmissibility of evidence to the states. In Schwartz v. Texas,6 5 the
Supreme Court of the United States held that Section 605 applies only
to the exclusion of evidence in federal court proceedings and not in
state court proceedings because it was not the intent of Congress to im-
pose a rule of evidence on the states. It said that Section 605 can be
enforced against state officers by imposing the penalty provided in Sec-
tion 50166 for infractions. Thus, the rule is that evidence obtained by
violating Section 605 is admissible in state courts, but not in federal
courts0 37 unless a trespass is committed that would make it a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.68
The Federal Communications Commission recently banned the use
of monitoring devices unless all the parties to the conversation have
knowledge of the devices and have given their consent to the use of
them. 9 This regulation applies only when radio waves are used and
does not apply to the operations of law enforcement agencies conducted
under lawful authority.70
" Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
60 Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, supra n. 58.
61 United States v. Bernava, 95 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1938).
62 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
63 Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957); Weiss v. United States, supra n. 59.
64 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
65 Supra n. 24; and see Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961).
66 47 U.S.C.A. § 501.
67 Hubin v. Maryland, 180 Md. 279, 23 A.2d 706 (1942); Harlem Check Cashing Corp.
v. Bell, 296 N.Y. 15, 68 N.E.2d 854 (1946).
68 People v. Channell, 107 Cal.App.2d 192, 236 P.2d 654 (1951).
69 31 Fed. Reg. 3400 (1966).
70 Ibid.
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Statutes Authorizing Eavesdropping and Wire-Tapping
Some states have enacted statutes which regulate eavesdropping
and wire-tapping 7' and authorize the eavesdropping trespass into consti-
tutionally protected areas under situations not dissimilar to those giving
rise to search warrants. In Illinois, the legislature recently defeated a
bill that would have permitted court ordered wire-tapping by law en-
forcement officials,7 2 and in a recent case 73 Pennsylvania construed its
statute to prohibit all wire-tapping, even by law enforcement officers.
The best known state statute regulating eavesdropping and wire-
tapping is that of New York.7 4 This statute derives its authority from a
provision in the New York Constitution 75 which expressly authorizes
wire-tapping by law enforcement officers acting pursuant to a valid
court order. The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Berger v. New York76 has declared the New York statute unconstitu-
tional. Applying the standards of previous Fourth Amendment decisions,
the Court held the statute was defective because (1) it did not require
belief that a particular offense had been or was being committed, and
it did not "particularly [describe] the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." 77 The Court said,
New York's statute lacks this particularization. It merely says that
a warrant may issue on reasonable ground to believe the evidence
of crime may be obtained by the eavesdrop. It lays down no require-
ment for particularity in the warrant as to what specific crime has
been or is being committed nor "the place to be searched," or "the
persons or things to be seized" as specifically required by the Fourth
Amendment. 78
71 Twenty-six states have passed statutes prohibiting wire-tapping; see Swire, op.
cit. supra n. 3. Seven states have passed statutes limiting electronic eavesdropping
in whole or in part; see Sullivan, op. cit. supra n. 7.
72 Aspen, op. cit. supra n. 7.
73 Commonwealth v. Murray, 423 Pa. 37, 223 A.2d 102 (1966).
74 N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. § 813-a (1958): "An ex parte order for eavesdropping
... may be issued . . .upon oath or affirmation .. .that there is reasonable ground
to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and particularly describing
the person or persons whose communications, conversations or discussions are to be
overheard or recorded and the purpose thereof .... In connection with the issuance
of such an order the justice or judge may examine on oath the applicant and any
other witness he may produce and shall satisfy himself of the existence of reason-
able grounds for the granting of such application. Any such order shall be effective
for the time specified therein but not for a period of more than two months unless
extended or renewed by the justice or judge who signed and issued the original
order upon satisfying himself that such extension or renewal is in the public interest.
75 N.Y. Const., Art. I, Sec. 12.
76 35 U.S.L.W. 4649 (June 12, 1967).
77 Constitution of the United States, Amendment 4.
78 Berger v. United States, supra n. 76 at 4653; see also People v. Grossman, 45
Misc.2d 557, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1965) rev'd on other grounds 27 A.D. 572, 276
N.Y.S.2d 168 (1966) where the court said that any eavesdrop order by a court would
be unconstitutional on its face because the evidence searched for must be particu-
larly described.
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The statute was held unconstitutional because (2) it authorized
eavesdropping for two months. This amounted to a series of intrusions
with only one showing of reasonable grounds. Probable cause should
be shown for each eavesdrop. The statute was held unconstitutional
also because (3) there was no provision for termination of the eaves-
drop order once the evidence sought was obtained, and (4) there was
no procedure for giving notice to the one being eavesdropped, nor was
there a provision for special facts to overcome this notice.
In short, the court held that the statute is "broadside authorization"
permitting "general searches by electronic devices" 1o and that the
statute's "blanket grant of permission to eavesdrop is without adequate
judicial supervision or protective procedures." 80
The decision in Berger v. New York"' does not overrule any of the
case law of eavesdropping. Olmstead v. United States
s2 still stands.8 3
Eavesdropping still is permitted where there is no trespass into a consti-
tutionally protected area. The Berger decision merely declares the New
York statute unconstitutional because it is too broad and does not pro-
vide adequate safeguards. It recognizes that the guarantees of the
Fourth Amendment are not absolute.
The Fourth Amendment does not make the "precincts of the home
or office . . . sanctuaries where the law can never reach . . .," but
it does prescribe a constitutional standard that must be met before
official invasion is permissible.8 4
The decision states that some of the elements favoring constitu-
tionality would be (1) "that a neutral and detached authority be
interposed between the police and the public," (2) that the affidavit
allege a specific criminal offense, (3) that the search be for a limited
purpose, (4) that the order describe with particularity the type of con-
versation sought, (5) that once the property is obtained, the officer
can't search further, (6) that the "order authorize one limited intrusion
rather than a series or a continuous surveillance," (7) that new orders
based on probable cause be issued for succeeding eavesdrops, (8) that
the order is executed with dispatch and not over a prolonged or ex-
tended period, and (9) that the "officer was required to and did make
a return on the order showing how it was executed and what was
seized."
79 Berger v. United States, supra n. 76 at 4653.
80 Ibid.
81 Supra n. 76.
82 Supra n. 23.
83 But see concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, Berger v. United States, supra
n. 76 at 4655.
84 Berger v. United States, supra n. 76 at 4655.
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Thus, it seems from the decision in the Berger case that court
ordered eavesdropping and wire-tapping will be allowed if it conforms
to the strict requirements governing search warrants.
Eavesdropping: Problem and Solution
The nature of the eavesdropping problem is that there are two op-
posing interests, both extremely important to the welfare of the people
of the United States. On the one hand is the need for hard-hitting and
efficient law enforcement to stem the rising crime rate and to protect
the safety of the individual. On the other hand is the need to protect
the integrity and dignity of the individual from excesses and abuses that
occasionally accompany unrestricted investigation. Unbridled eaves-
dropping would bring with it some of these excesses. Complete re-
striction of eavesdropping certainly would limit the effectiveness of
law enforcement. The chief result would be the failure to convict
persons who otherwise would have been convicteds5
Organized crime which uses all the modern techniques of elec-
tronics and communications can no longer be combated with horse
and buggy methods8s
The trend of recent decisions is proceeding toward a balancing of
one interest with the other. Eavesdropping where there is no trespass
into a constitutionally protected area should be liberally permitted in
the interest of law enforcement. Where one retreats to a constitutionally
protected area, his right of privacy should be jealously guarded, and
his privacy should be invaded only upon compliance with the standards
prescribed by the Fourth Amendment. However, when one does re-
treat to a constitutionally protected area, he should be cognizant of its
boundaries, and when communications intended to be solely within the
confines of the protected area penetrate into unprotected areas, he should
not be heard to cry that those communications are protected by the
right of privacy.
85 Sullivan, op. cit. su,;ra n. 7.
86 Aspen, op. cit. supra n. 7.
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